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1223 
PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND POLITICS 
Mark Tushnet* 
Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery. By Rebecca 
J. Scott. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 
365. $29.95. 
Introduction 
Rebecca Scott
1 is a historian, not an economist. Describing how a dis-
pute over a mule’s ownership was resolved, Professor Scott reproduces a 
receipt two claimants left when they took the mule from the plantation 
whose manager claimed it as well (p. 185). By contrast, analyzing property 
relations in the pre–Civil War American South, economic historian Jenny 
Wahl observes, “[E]conomic historians tend to [use] . . . frequency tables, 
graphs, and charts.”
2 The differences in visual aids to understanding indicate 
the various ways historians and economists approach a single topic—the 
relation between markets and politics, the latter defined to include the de-
ployment of collective force. Professor Scott’s theme is the mutual 
dependence of markets and politics in post-emancipation Louisiana and 
Cuba. Professor Scott examines post-emancipation Louisiana and Cuba, 
which are similar in some respects and different in others. Sugar production 
was important in both locations, for example, but the politics of freedom 
differed: In Louisiana freedom resulted from the North’s defeat of the South 
in a civil war, whereas in Cuba it resulted from an independence struggle by 
Cubans, including slaves, against colonial domination.
3 Few economists 
would disagree with many of the propositions that they would extract from 
her narrative. Yet the tension between narrative and proposition is apparent. 
This Review explores some aspects of that tension. Part I describes in 
largely economic terms some aspects of the post-emancipation property ar-
rangements that Professor Scott describes historically. Relying on Professor 
Scott’s descriptions in Part II, I sketch why her insistence on the mutual de-
pendence of markets and politics is correct, with some speculation about 
why a division of labor among economists leads many economics-
influenced legal scholars to underemphasize that dependence. It would be 
foolish to claim, and I do not, that only a historian could illuminate the  
                                                                                                                      
 *   William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
  1.  Charles Gibson Distinguished University Professor of History and Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan. 
 2.  Jenny Bourne Wahl, The Bondsman’s Burden: An Economic Analysis of the 
Common Law of Slavery 19 (1998). 
  3.  The Cuban war for independence resulted in slavery’s abolition; had the Southern war 
for independence succeeded, it would have resulted in slavery’s further entrenchment. TUSHNET PAGINATED TYPE.DOC 2/27/2007 9:34 AM 
1224  Michigan Law Review  [Vol. 105:1223 
 
mutual dependence of markets and politics. Rather, the historian’s narratives 
and the economist’s propositions shed light on that phenomenon from dif-
ferent angles. 
One way of putting the differences is this: the historian offers narratives 
that the economist sees as instantiations of the kinds of general propositions 
economists capture in their equations.
4 Economists worry, though, that, lack-
ing the discipline imposed by some well-specified theory, historians include 
in their narratives matters that more rigorous analysis would show to be ir-
relevant to the larger story the historian is telling—chance events such as the 
weather conditions on a particular day that lack the causal significance that 
the historian’s narrative implicitly imputes to them simply by including 
them in the story. 
While the economist offers general propositions, historians in turn worry 
that the economists’ equations may provide accurate depictions of aggregate 
behavior, but exclude too much individual human experience that might be 
relevant to the larger story. Historians tend to be theory-skeptics, at least in 
the modest sense that they doubt that the theories we now have at hand are 
the ultimate theories that will account for the behavior they observe in his-
tory. They include material in their narratives that they sense might be 
important in the end, even if they do not yet have a full set of propositions 
that explain the material’s relevance.
5 
Finally, historians are devoted to what economists would call small-N 
studies, that is, studies with few observations, on which one cannot reliably 
establish general propositions. Professor Scott’s study has but two observa-
tions. Although some economists would be dismissive of a study that, as 
they view it, has only two data points, good economists appreciate small-N 
studies because they can suggest hypotheses that might be tested by examin-
ing a larger number of cases. Yet, economists have “priors” about which 
hypotheses are likely to be testable, and so will extract “economic-like” hy-
potheses from the historian’s narrative more readily than they will extract 
other hypotheses. And when the economists do so, historians may see the 
economists as strikingly narrow.
6 
                                                                                                                      
  4.  I note that there are quite deep epistemological issues that I elide here. In particular, the 
position I sketch takes no position on whether there is a way of knowing things, usually described 
by the term Verstehen or as “apprehending” or “grasping” truth, independent of knowledge gained 
by the application of general laws—what I have been calling propositions—to facts. The differences 
I describe all arise within an epistemology that does not necessarily include Verstehen as a way of 
knowing. 
  5.  An example is Professor Scott’s discussion of the details of the Louisiana constitutional 
convention’s disfranchisement of African Americans in 1898. Pp. 154–66. Throughout the discus-
sion, Professor Scott alludes to the existence of, and difficulty of maintaining, cross-racial and 
cross-class political alliances. As I argue later in this Review, the connection between politics and 
markets is one of Professor Scott’s central themes, and the existence of cross-racial and cross-class 
alliances is obviously important in politics generally. Yet, precisely how and why such alliances 
arose and were blocked remains more obscure in Professor Scott’s account than do the hows and 
whys of other themes.  
  6.  This is not a conceptual point about the differences between history and economics as 
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I. The Right to Property and Contract 
Slavery was, among other things, a system of organizing the use of labor 
in farming and other forms of production. But, referring to Cuban planters 
(though true in Louisiana as well) Professor Scott writes, “[T]hey did have 
to face the reality that in the long run some other form of organization of 
labor would need to be developed” (p. 95). What follows are some descrip-
tions of arrangements that arose to replace slavery. 
Some farmers in Cuba owned their own land and sold their sugar cane to 
larger plantations and refiners. In Professor Scott’s words, the contracts  
provid[ed] for a share of the benefits to go to the individual grower but 
pegg[ed] remuneration to the price of sugar in order to minimize the finan-
cial risk for mill owners. The mill would make advances, supervise certain 
aspects of the growing, and receive the cane, settling the account once a 
season. (p. 117)  
Although Professor Scott describes these contracts as “draconian,” one 
of the cane purchasers “complained that the ‘colonos [farmers] are giving us 
much more trouble than we anticipated . . . refus[ing] to sign new contracts 
unless we make them large advances, for more than their property is 
worth.’
 ”
7 
An officer of the U.S. occupation forces in Cuba more than a decade 
later offered a rich description of labor arrangements:  
“[T]he wages . . . are not sufficient to enable a man to support a family and 
save enough to buy the yoke of oxen, cart, plow, and pony, necessary to his 
independence.” He reported that “the laborers are not even allowed to cul-
tivate gardens as they would then spend less of their wages at the Owner’s 
Store; on other estates they are given land and encouraged to an independ-
ence which however stops just short of selling them the land.” A laborer 
might occupy land rent free “in consideration of his being available for 
employment on an Ingenio [the estate’s refinery],” or farm on shares, or 
occasionally pay a small rent. (p. 181) 
What system would work best for which industries was largely unknown 
because the use of slave labor had impeded development of parallel free 
labor systems. Consider sugar: Someone had to raise the sugar cane and 
transfer its ownership or possession to a refiner, who would produce the 
final product. Experience under slavery made it clear that refining could be 
done most effectively in large-scale factories. Beyond that, owners of capi-
tal, factory workers, and field workers would have to figure out what forms 
of labor organization were most efficient. 
Plainly, factory workers would not bring anything other than their labor 
to the production process, but even there, should they be paid a fixed hourly, 
weekly, or seasonal wage, or should there be some sort of piece work   
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system? Possibilities for raising sugar cane were even more varied. A cane 
field could be owned by the person who worked it, with the product sold to 
the refinery. The field could be leased from the refiner or a third party for a 
fixed rental. The sugar farmer could be a sharecropper, paying a variable 
rental fee and receiving a variable amount for the sugar he raised. And lay-
ered over all these possibilities were additional variations for buying the 
supplies needed to operate the sugar farm and the necessities of life. For 
example, a tenant could be allowed to raise pigs for home consumption, or 
could be prohibited from doing so. Professor Scott offers this description of 
what happened on one estate: 
In June an old wall on the estate was taken down, leaving the “negros pig 
styes without protection so they will have to sell them or have them stolen 
it is imeterial [sic] to us which.” Unsurprisingly, within a few weeks [the 
estate’s manager] was reporting “a good deal of trouble with the negros 
who want me to pay them at the rate of $3 1/2 per month for having taken 
from them the raising of pigs for sale.” (p. 112) 
On what basis would the labor arrangements be chosen? In part, of 
course, these arrangements would be determined by the industry’s character-
istics. Sugar refining could not go on without a labor arrangement that 
would bring large numbers of workers together under the supervision of a 
production manager. But, perhaps more important, the arrangements would 
be chosen on the basis of risk and with the possibility of opportunism.  
Compare a contract to pay a worker a fixed wage with a sharecropping 
contract, in a world where natural disasters such as hurricanes can destroy a 
crop or where exogenous changes in demand can drive prices up or down 
substantially. The contract will determine who bears the consequences of the 
risk if it comes about. Similarly, different contracts provide different oppor-
tunities for opportunism, usually described as “shirking” when we talk 
about workers and “exploitation”—often of informational advantages—
when we talk about employers. Describing one former slave in Cuba, Pro-
fessor Scott writes, “In the year after she achieved formal freedom, her wage 
rose from 3 pesos a month to 8, but she did not work at all on the estate 
from June through December of 1886, in contrast to the year before” (p. 
111). Here, it seems, the wage increase compensated for assumption of a 
greater risk of unemployment. 
Professor Scott provides many examples of diverse contractual forms. 
William James leased a plantation in Louisiana for three years, and organ-
ized a work force of over eighty men and women who “partner[ed] with him 
in the hiring and working of it.”
8 “Planters . . . were ‘generally averse to 
leasing land to the freedmen,’
 ” who were in turn unwilling to agree to an-
nual wage contracts, and eventually arranged for wages paid at least 
monthly (p. 37). Elsewhere, an employer paid workers the wages they had 
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accumulated over three months.
9 Facing resistance from former slaves who 
refused to work unless they could raise vegetables and other staples, one 
planter “
 ‘ [g]ave the negroes their land’
 ”—that is, allowed them to use por-
tions of the property they leased from him for their domestic purposes (p. 
38). 
II. Enforcing Property and Contract Rights: Politics 
Eventually labor arrangements would stabilize, as workers and owners 
of land and physical capital came to understand their risk preferences and 
risks of opportunism, and as inefficient labor arrangements were competed 
away. In the early days after emancipation, though, nobody knew what ar-
rangements would make sense for the long haul. This placed everyone at 
real risk. More than would be true in a stable economy, the parties might 
choose a contractual arrangement that seemed sensible but turned out to be 
quite bad, and one or the other side would want to get out of the duties it 
imposed. What then? Most of us today would think the answer obvious: the 
disgruntled party would go to court to enforce the agreement.
10 Professor 
Scott shows why going to court might not have been immediately available 
in Louisiana and Cuba. 
Courts become available to enforce contracts only as a result of political 
action—which, in turn, sometimes depends on the labor arrangements in 
place. In this way markets and politics are mutually dependent. The classical 
definition of civil rights makes the point transparent. In the usage of the 
mid- and late-nineteenth century, the term referred to the right to own prop-
erty and the right to enter into contracts, both located in the private 
economy, but also to the right to sue and, importantly, the right to testify in 
court.
11 The reason is clear: without the ability to present one’s case to the 
courts, the rights to contract and property would be empty ones, existing at 
the sufferance of the people with whom one contracted. Making a narrow 
point with much broader implications, Professor Scott points out, “[a]ny 
cross-racial movement that might need a modicum of legal protection . . . to 
survive . . . was left utterly vulnerable” (pp. 198–99). 
Two examples of contracts I described earlier make clear the connection 
between contracts and the assumption that they will be enforced. According 
to Professor Scott, in the case of the payments of three months’ accumulated 
wages, withholding monthly wage payments “had been illegal” during the 
period just before the contracts were signed, when workers were in formal 
apprenticeships, and she intimates that withholding such payments from free 
workers would be a fortiori illegal (p. 116). The estate manager who had 
                                                                                                                      
  9.  P. 116. Professor Scott says that “[m]onthly salaries had evidently been withheld,” al-
though it might be that the contracts were for payment at three-month intervals. 
  10.  Alternatively, we might rely on stable norms enforced by social sanctions. Such norms 
and sanctions were unavailable in the fluid and racially divided societies Professor Scott describes. 
(Thanks to Adrian Vermeule for this observation.) 
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trouble with workers who wanted to raise pigs or get higher pay “put three 
of their ‘ringleaders’ in the stocks—a procedure outlawed some years be-
fore” (p. 112). 
The managers in these instances were able to get away with these illegal 
or at least highly questionable practices because their workers did not have 
effective access to the courts. The entire thrust of Professor Scott’s narrative 
is showing how the emancipated populations in Louisiana and Cuba mobi-
lized politically, in part precisely to ensure that they would be able to protect 
their rights as free workers. Because political action had broader implica-
tions as well, in only a few examples does Professor Scott’s treatment of 
politics focus expressly on access to the courts. She describes the willing-
ness of the courts “[i]n the majority black, strongly Republican parish of 
Terrebonne” to enforce the priority created by workmen’s liens for workers’ 
claims against their employers’ property” (p. 48). The workmen’s lien, Pro-
fessor Scott observes, gave workers a “powerful tool,” but using it “required 
that freedpeople get a fair hearing in the local courts, which in turn required 
maintaining the judicial standing and public respect that conservatives were 
bent on denying them” (p. 48). 
Because the forms of labor arrangements that individuals made varied 
widely, and because choices were fluid in the state of economic and legal 
uncertainty that prevailed after emancipation, for free labor to flourish, the 
legal system had to enforce whatever contracts workers made, but did not 
have to assess the fairness of the contracts themselves. This rather modest 
aspect of freedom could be satisfied, Professor Scott shows, only if the freed 
workers had sufficient political power:  
In the years after slavery various possibilities were open. . . . As long as the 
struggle had a strong electoral and labor dimension, as it did in Louisiana 
during Reconstruction, or involved a cross-racial movement for national 
independence, as it did in Cuba, it remained a true contest. White suprem-
acy was a political project . . . [that] required legal backing right up to the 
top of the system. (pp. 258–59). 
As I have suggested, today we simply assume that courts will be avail-
able to enforce contracts, and look to labor economists and students of 
industrial organization to analyze why particular labor arrangements make 
sense for specific industries and for people with particular risk preferences.
12 
We relegate the task of analyzing the development of courts and other po-
litical institutions to political economists, and even those scholars tend to 
focus on the normal operation of legislatures and courts, examining the con-
ditions under which courts function effectively only when their attention is 
directed to crisis or transitional settings—such as post-emancipation Louisi-
ana and Cuba. But even then, they do not go back to examine the connection 
between the courts they analyze and labor arrangements, as Professor Scott 
does in her historian’s manner. 
                                                                                                                      
  12.  My comments in this paragraph are based on the impressions I have had on reading what 
seem to me to be separate bodies of work by economists, who deal with contracting and labor ar-
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Professor Scott recounts the stories, familiar to specialists in Louisianan 
and Cuban history, of suffrage struggles and their contrasting outcomes. In 
Louisiana, enfranchisement following emancipation was preserved as long 
as Republicans controlled the national government. After Reconstruction’s 
end, disfranchisement became a primary goal of Louisiana’s racial and so-
cial conservatives. They first accomplished a statutory disfranchisement, 
then embedded their success in Louisiana’s 1898 constitution, which com-
bined facially race-neutral restrictions on the franchise, such as literacy and 
property requirements, with a “grandfather clause,” which allowed people 
who had the right to vote in 1867 (before Congress extended the right to 
vote to African-American men) and their heirs to “acquire a permanent right 
to vote, without meeting the literacy and property requirements otherwise 
introduced by the new constitution” (pp. 163–64). Reflecting the cross-
racial military alliances that had prevailed against the Spanish colonial re-
gime and carried through during the U.S. occupation, the Cuban 
Constitution of 1901–1902 created universal manhood suffrage, to the slight 
discomfort of the occupying forces (pp. 205–06). 
The right to vote mattered not because voters could use it to obtain spe-
cial interest legislation, but because without it they could not protect the 
civil rights they were nominally guaranteed. Suffrage “served as an impor-
tant buffer against antidemocratic temptations and provided the framework 
within which a multitude of labor, mutual-aid, and educational associations 
. . . could proliferate” (pp. 258–60). The right to vote “carried with it . . . 
political leverage . . . [that] spread out into other realms of action, and par-
ticularly to the exercise of collective bargaining and of access to law” (p. 
260). Again, I would stress how modest these claims really are: politics mat-
tered because it allowed for the access to law that made meaningful the 
contracts free workers signed. 
Legal protection for forms of labor flowed from political power, but 
forms of labor also affected the ability of workers to exercise political 
power. The clearest example Professor Scott provides comes from her 
treatment of gang wage labor. 
The same labor segmentation that fenced black workers into specific 
jobs and not others created spaces in which solidarity could be constructed 
and enforced by the workers themselves: “Living in the planter-owned quar-
ters, though otherwise a source of vulnerability, had an organizational 
advantage, for it made communication quick and group action feasible” (p. 
83). 
One need not agree with the connotations of the term fenced into to see 
how gang wage labor had political implications, as, of course, did the vul-
nerability of the workers to expulsion from their housing. Conservatives in 
Louisiana understood that labor segmentation had political consequences: 
“Potential alliances would be thwarted, and civic silence enforced selec-
tively upon black workers” (p. 88). But, as Professor Scott immediately 
notes, “it was easier said than done” (p. 88). The reason, I think, is that mar-
kets, while dependent on politics for their basic operation, also have some 
freedom from politics. Workers’ risk preferences and human capital   TUSHNET PAGINATED TYPE.DOC 2/27/2007 9:34 AM 
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endowments are not determined by race, and sustaining a racially segmented 
market under conditions of free labor (where workers have access to the 
courts) is quite difficult.  
Much of Professor Scott’s narrative, particularly its treatment of Cuba, 
deals with the details of constructing cross-racial political alliances, and 
alliances between workers in the countryside and workers in urban areas.
13 
As she writes, “[T]he links between structures and outcomes are rarely sim-
ple” (p. 153). The military struggle for national independence in Cuba 
created conditions for cross-racial political alliances that were absent in 
Louisiana, and, more important for present purposes, probably was a more 
significant factor in sustaining such alliances than the forms of labor on 
which I have focused were. Again, the historian’s interest in granular detail 
is in tension with the social scientist’s interest in generalization. 
Early in her discussion, Professor Scott observes, “Each new initiative 
[by rural workers] .  .  . threatened elements of white supremacy on two 
fronts: the workplace and the public sphere” (pp. 82–83). This is a pretty 
good summary of the idea that markets (the workplace) and politics (the 
public sphere) are mutually dependent. That idea pervades, indeed it might 
be said to constitute the main theme of, Degrees of Freedom. At the same 
time, we should note that Professor Scott’s rich descriptions of contracting 
processes, politics, and race resist reduction to the economist’s proposi-
tions—to the explanatory sketches I have laid out in this Review—even as 
they generate such propositions. 
Conclusion 
I have examined Professor Scott’s work with a quite narrowly focused 
lens. I have been, I think, reasonably self-conscious about my interest in 
extracting propositions from Degrees of Freedom, in the service of the con-
trast I have drawn between the historian’s and the economist’s sensibility. 
My summaries of contracts omit even the names of the parties and the plan-
tations they worked on, for example, and Professor Scott’s different practice 
reflects the historian’s sensibility that details matter. 
I should conclude, therefore, by emphasizing how elegantly she has con-
structed  Degrees of Freedom. She gracefully brings the limitations of 
historical knowledge to our attention. For example, from the fact that census 
records reveal their residences and common last names, she infers that sev-
eral individuals who resided near each other after emancipation were slaves 
on the same plantation, and notes that inferential step.
14 Her subtle refer-
ences to what we do not and cannot know about the past remind us that 
                                                                                                                      
 13.  See, e.g., p. 78 (describing the construction of alliances between activists in the country-
side and in the towns). 
 14.  See pp. 23–24 (naming the Albis/Sarría family as the owners of the Soledad plantation); 
p. 119 (identifying residents of a town with the surname Sarría as former slaves from the Soledad 
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there is much we do not—and probably cannot—know about the present or 
about the general propositions economists urge on us. 
Degrees of Freedom is in part comparative history by juxtaposition, ex-
amining how similar issues—labor arrangements in the sugar industry, the 
distribution of the franchise in a racially divided society—were resolved in 
places that were similar yet different. But it is also comparative history by 
connection.
15 Professor Scott describes Cubans who spent time in Louisiana 
and Louisianans who spent time in Cuba.
16 The military commander who 
served for twenty-four hours as the military governor of New Orleans in 
1874 becomes the first U.S. military governor of Cuba in 1899 (p. 155). 
Professor Scott builds on these personal connections to enhance our appre-
ciation of the thematic resonances between the Louisianan and Cuban 
portions of her narrative.
17 
The very elegance of Professor Scott’s presentation shows how histori-
ans can contribute to our understanding of economic practices. A diagram or 
chart might help some of us, but the photographs and details Professor Scott 
provides will help others.  
                                                                                                                      
 15.  E.g., p. 4 (“[T]he stories become intertwined rather than juxtaposed . . . .”). 
 16.  See, e.g., pp. 2–4. 
  17.  I use the singular here deliberately. TUSHNET PAGINATED TYPE.DOC 2/27/2007 9:34 AM 
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